How the Taliban will shape Pakistan’s future

ADNAN AAMIR: The Taliban took control of Afghanistan on August 15 when president Ashraf Ghani fled the country. The fighters’ offensive started with the capture of provincial capitals on August 6 and, in less than 10 days, the group had taken over the entire country.

The situation in Afghanistan has captured the world’s attention, but the biggest impact may well be felt in Pakistan. Indeed, there are two potential paths that will determine how a Taliban government in Afghanistan affects its eastern neighbour.

The first revolves around Pakistan’s influence on the Taliban. The fact that its embassy is one of the few diplomatic missions still operational in Kabul, along with the Chinese and Russian embassies, reveals much about its sway.

Pakistan has been accused of actively supporting the Taliban over the past two decades, although Islamabad denies the claims. However, there is no doubting its influence.

In this context, Islamabad will look to prevent anti-Pakistan militants – in particular the Pakistani Taliban, also known as Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and Baloch separatists – from using Afghan soil to mount attacks.

Islamabad claims both groups have found a safe haven in Afghanistan to mount operations in Pakistan. With a new Afghan government in the making, Pakistan wants the Taliban to root out these militant groups.

Last month, a Taliban spokesman said the group would not allow anyone to use Afghanistan as a base against neighbouring countries. If it makes good on that commitment, it will need to take action against TTP militants based in the provinces of Kunar, Nuristan and Nangarhar.

That would leave the TTP unable to carry out significant attacks inside Pakistan. This, in turn, could reduce Islamist militancy in the country and discourage the Jihadi culture of using arms to enforce sharia law. Such an outcome would be a major win for Pakistan in its own war against Islamist terrorism.

Likewise, Pakistan expects that the Taliban will not tolerate Baloch separatist operations in Afghanistan.

The Baloch National Movement, a political party sympathetic to Baloch separatists, has urged the United Nations to take immediate steps to protect the lives of Baloch refugees in Afghanistan. However, Islamabad has a different take: they not refugees but supporters and facilitators of Baloch insurgents.
Without a base in Afghanistan, the ability of the separatists to carry out attacks inside Pakistan’s Balochistan province would also be much diminished.

Therefore, the new Taliban government’s decisions will greatly affect Pakistan’s counter-insurgency efforts in Balochistan. It is possible that a degree of peace could descend on Pakistan’s most turbulent province.

The second scenario is one where the Taliban backtracks on its commitments and instead promotes Islamist militancy. Taliban ideology is based on enforcing sharia law, taking over the government by force. The TTP has the same motives, and the Afghan Taliban might be tempted to lend support.

Pakistan security officials have expressed fears of possible collaboration between the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban. In July, Pakistani security officials said in a parliamentary briefing that the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban were two sides of the same coin.

In the past few months, the TTP has re-emerged as a potent national security threat, carrying out 26 attacks inside Pakistan in July alone, mostly targeting border security posts and killing 56 personnel.

According to a report from the UN’s Al-Qaida Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, submitted to the Security Council in 2020, there are more than 6,000 TTP militants in Afghanistan. Its leader, Noor Wali Mehsud, claimed in a CNN interview that “[the TTP’s] goal is to take control of the border regions [of Pakistan] and make them independent”.

Afghan Taliban support for the TTP would prove catastrophic for Pakistan, potentially posing an existential threat to the country. It could push Pakistan back to the 2009-14 period, when the TTP controlled significant territory and was only 100km from the capital.

Such a situation would destroy any hopes of economic recovery and permanently halt Chinese-funded Belt and Road Initiative projects in Pakistan. The security establishment sees this as a worst-case scenario, and officials will exert as much pressure as possible on the Afghan Taliban to prevent it from happening.

Since taking charge in Afghanistan, the Taliban has made a number of pledges, including that it will uphold peaceful relations with the world, women’s rights will be respected under Islamic law, and that an amnesty would be granted to opponents who worked with foreign powers.

This suggests the group is concerned about its international image, and that may force it to make good on its commitment to ban terrorist groups from launching attacks from Afghan soil.

That would bring relief for the Pakistan government – for now. However, the Taliban’s true colours have yet to be revealed and we will know more in a few months, after it has established firm control over all aspects of the Afghan government and society.

Only then will the world know whether the Taliban has remained true to its commitment to its benefactor Pakistan, or to its ideological brothers-in-arms in the TTP.

Adnan Aamir is a journalist and columnist based in Quetta, Pakistan