India, China and Bhutan trialogue can bring clarity on borders

Medha Bisht: The Bhutan-China border engagement was in the headlines recently. A statement by the Bhutanese prime minister during his Europe tour was interpreted differently in Bhutan, India and China. The media in Bhutan claimed that the kingdom has an equal claim in negotiations as India and China, emphasising the limitations of the “small-state” caveat that overburdens strategic discourse in South Asia. In India, it was reported that the construction of villages by China along the Amochhu river suggested that Bhutan has ceded territory to China. Meanwhile, Chinese media claimed that India was the main obstruction in the formal demarcation of the Bhutan-China boundary.

Ambiguity has been a part of strategic articulations over natural borders. Lack of clarity about mountain passes, referred to as frontiers, routes and anti-routes, has perpetuated strategic myopia. The Chumbi Valley, for one, is a tenuous and treacherous mountain frontier — inhospitable but not insurmountable. It is important for strategic and economic reasons and has a significant relational value given its proximity to the Amochhu river. Also known as the Bhutanese route to Tibet, it is a short and easy route to open communication lines with Tibet.

The Chumbi Valley offers a key to understanding the controversies associated with the China-Bhutan border negotiations. It is also reflective of two broad principles guiding the demarcations of borders in the Himalayas. The first of these is the Thalweg Doctrine and the second is the water-parting principle. The first principle emphasises the idea of map-making by identifying rivers as the central point and measuring the boundary from the lowest point of a riverbed. In contrast, the water-parting principle identifies territory with a concerned watershed, where the boundary is determined by the highest elevation surrounding that particular lake or river segment. Both these principles have been merged in the ongoing border negotiations between China and Bhutan.

The dispute in the north-west sector of the China-Bhutan border has revolved around the watershed of the Chumbi Valley, and the height of certain Himalayan ranges. The focus on Mt Gipmochi and the construction of Chinese villages along the west bank of Amochhu river suggest that the Thalweg Doctrine is the compromise formula for solving the disputed claims. The focus on the Amochhu can be central for stitching together the claims and counterclaims, thus helping in reconciling both the direction of talks and developments on ground. A chronological understanding would help.

For instance, in 2012, China-Bhutan border talks focused on delimiting the north-western border. By 2016, both countries conducted joint surveys successfully. However, the China-Bhutan border discourse took a distinct turn with the Doklam stand-off in 2017. On its part, New Delhi stated that the bilateral issue between Bhutan and China is of strategic concern to India. China, meanwhile, articulated its position through a legal claim via the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890. In fact, this has become the primary frame of reference for China’s negotiating position. Article 1 of the Convention notes that the crest of the mountain range would be Mt Gipmochi. Significantly, the Amochhu flows adjacent to Mt Gipmochi. Both India and Bhutan have rejected these claims and stated that the boundary line should follow from Batangla, Merugla and Sinchula ranges as these peaks are higher than Gipmochi. The Chinese have ignored these assertions. They have continued to build villages.

Notwithstanding these clear positions, the public gaze is burdened by speculations. If one were to extrapolate meanings from Chinese assertions then the compromise formula through the Thalweg Doctrine emerges as a middle ground explanation for a potential breakthrough in China-Bhutan negotiations.

While one should not read too much into the timing of the Bhutan king’s recent goodwill visit to New Delhi, questions related to Doklam are sure to chase India-Bhutan relations. Apropos the security aspects associated with this visit, the Foreign Secretary has reiterated that the tri-junction would be resolved trilaterally. This statement has its root in the post Doklam standoff of 2017, when the Ministry of External Affairs reminded the Chinese of their commitment to the norm of mutual agreement for deciding the tri-junction. Invocation of the India-China agreement on the Working Mechanism on Consultation and Coordination, which was the 15th round of Sino-Indian Special Representative (SR) dialogue, 2012, becomes significant in this context. Unless consciously classified, no mention of the term “tri-junction” and “consultation with third countries” can be found regarding the 2012 agreement, in the pre-2017 Indian records.

The Chinese, on their part, mention that the SRs discussed bilateral, regional and global issues. Terms such as “tri-junction” and “consultation with third countries” are also absent in 2012 press releases from China. Interestingly, the Chinese, in response to the MEA statement in 2017, noted, “What was agreed in the 2012 understanding was that in the future, the parties will conduct demarcation on the side of the tri-junction area. The bone of contention is not what is stated in the 2012 understanding, but what is stated in the 1890 convention.” This explicit acknowledgement by China reveals the frame of reference for understanding the Sino-Bhutan boundary dispute from Beijing’s perspective.

As strategic ambiguities give rise to speculations, it is important that a trilogue is initiated. Opening communication channels can minimise uncertainties as questions of peace and conflict cannot be resolved by potential stand-offs (like Doklam) in the future.

(The writer is associate professor at Department of International Relations, South Asian University, New Delhi)