Manila gets tough in the South China Sea as a showdown looms

INTERNATIONAL DESK: While Taiwan has long been considered a potential flashpoint between the U.S. and China, another geopolitical storm may be brewing in the South China Sea — one that could force Washington to make some difficult choices.

From laser pointers blinding Philippine sailors to collisions at sea near key military outposts, tensions are rapidly surging between Manila and Beijing in these strategically and economically important waters, where the two have overlapping claims.

By bolstering the country’s defense capabilities as well as deepening defense ties with the U.S. and like-minded countries such as Japan and Australia, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has taken a tough stance on territorial disputes with China — and he is backing this up with bold moves.

Earlier this month, Manila announced that more partners would join naval patrols in the disputed waters, while revealing plans to develop Philippine-controlled islands and reefs in the Spratly Island chain, with the country’s military now tasked with coming up with “innovative” ways to handle the issue.

Manila’s newfound assertiveness has likely been emboldened by assurances from the U.S. that the countries’ 1951 mutual defense treaty applies to “armed attacks on either nation’s armed forces or public vessels anywhere in the South China Sea.”

But while the moves are intended to deter Beijing, they are also increasing the chances of an incident exploding into a wider conflict, experts say, with some viewing the steps as indications that the window for diplomacy may be closing.

Beijing claims a large chunk of the resource-rich South China Sea but rejects any involvement by nonclaimant states in the territorial dispute, including the U.S., Canada, Australia and Japan.

Tensions have been rising so fast in recent months that senior Chinese and Philippine officials agreed last week to “further improve maritime communication and properly manage their differences through consultation … to better deal with urgent situations at sea, especially manage the situation at Renai Reef (the Chinese name for Second Thomas Shoal).”

The shoal has been at the center of simmering tensions, as Chinese ships continue to harass resupply vessels near a Philippine garrison atop the aging Sierra Madre warship, which was deliberately grounded there in 1999 to assert Philippine sovereignty claims.

With neither side willing to give in, Philippine military chief Gen. Romeo Brawner last week announced plans to upgrade nine territorial features in the area, including installing a desalination machine at Second Thomas Shoal, to make them more habitable for troops.

The primary goal of these plans would be to sustain a presence in the area and reduce the need for rotation and resupply missions, said Aries Arugay, a visiting senior fellow at the ISEAS Yusof-Ishak Institute in Singapore.

By doing so, Manila also hopes to make it much harder for China to force the Philippines to abandon the outpost by blocking critical supplies.

“The most important needs for the Philippine outposts are mainly quality of life improvements,” said Gregory Poling, director of the Southeast Asia Program at the U.S.-based Center for Strategic and International Studies.

These outposts are much less developed than those of any of the other claimant states, and their personnel live in much worse conditions, he said.

While upgrades to other features shouldn’t face major constraints, it is unclear how Manila plans to improve conditions aboard the Sierra Madre as China continues to impede access.

“China has not opposed the Philippines to supply food and water for the soldiers on the warship, but it opposes the Philippines to transport construction materials and other equipment to the area to consolidate the ship and to make its presence there more permanent,” said Zhiqun Zhu, an international relations professor at Bucknell University in the U.S.

Beijing considers this as both a violation of a tacit agreement and an attempt to change the status quo by Manila, he said.

Also unclear is the extent to which Manila plans to bolster the military capabilities on these features.

“The purpose … is to entrench more island-type defenses in the South China Sea to counteract China’s dredging and building of numerous atolls and islands where it has installed military facilities,” said the Council on Foreign Relations’ Joshua Kurlantzick.

Given the poor conditions of the rusting Sierra Madre, some, such as Blake Herzinger of the United States Studies Center at the University of Sydney, have even said that Manila should establish a forward-operating base at the shoal “before being forced to react to deteriorating conditions.”

“The Philippines should remove the Sierra Madre and replace it with a permanent structure manned by combined rotational forces from both the Philippines and the U.S. Marine Corps,” Herzinger wrote, adding that Manila would be “well within its rights” to maintain a security presence there under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea.

The best structure to replace the Sierra Madre, he noted, would be a repurposed oil platform, oil rig or accommodation platform. Manila has never indicated that it plans to move in such a direction and it’s unclear how this would be possible without risking direct conflict with Beijing.

The worsening situation has prompted the Philippine leadership to think of new approaches and potential worst-case scenarios.

After noting “very little progress” in addressing the disputes using “traditional methods of diplomacy,” Marcos has called on his military commanders to bring about a “paradigm shift,” particularly as Manila’s focus shifts from internal to territorial defense.

Experts such as Zachary Abuza, a professor at the U.S. National War College, believe the Philippine leader — who has vowed not to lose “an inch” of territory to China — would like to see greater deterrence efforts, including through a more permanent military presence in Philippine-claimed waters, along with increased patrols.

“I think it’s notable that the Philippines is trying to build up its naval forces, albeit with a limited budget, to signal its resolve,” he said, adding that the procurement of anti-ship missiles from India sends an important message in this regard.

But Manila also understands its military’s limits, which is why it is also strengthening and expanding its international security partnerships.

“By involving the U.S., Australia, and Japan in various ways in Philippine security, Manila believes it is trying to make China aware of the risk of horizontal escalation and deter harassment and coercion of Philippine Coast Guard and fishing vessels,” said Masashi Murano, a defense expert at the U.S.-based Hudson Institute.

The Marcos administration has agreed to allow a larger American military presence in the country, while deepening ties with Japan, which is not only expected to sign a visiting forces agreement with Manila later this year but also make the Philippines the first recipient of its military aid program.

Manila would want Washington to come to its aid in case of a conflict with China, and it would probably like Japan to also play a role in its defense, Kurlantzick said.

The first steps into a possible coalition seem to be emerging in the form of joint Philippine patrols with U.S. and Australian warships. Japan has remained cautious about involving the Self-Defense Forces — but not out of fear of angering Beijing.

“The main reason for the limited Japanese presence is probably due to Tokyo’s limited assets, rather than to considerations for China,” Murano said.

While Tokyo understands the risk of conflict in the area, it has little room to join South China Sea patrols, since this would leave it stretched in the East China Sea and Sea of Japan.

For Tokyo, the issue is simply a matter of prioritization, said Murano.

While some experts say Manila should continue improving its military capabilities while crafting more defense partnerships, others ask whether the way it is handling the disputes serves the Philippines’ national interest.

“The South China Sea has become a venue of U.S.-China competition,” said Zhu.

“U.S. allies such as the Philippines may wish to take a more nuanced and balanced approach toward this rivalry instead of adding fuel to the fire, especially when Washington and Beijing are trying to stabilize their relationship,” he said. (THEJAPANTIMES)